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By Franklin E. Zimring*

In its current crisis the American system of
criminal justice has no friends. Overcrowded,
unprincipled and ill-coordinated, the institutions in our society that determine whether and
to what extent a criminal defendant should be
punished are detested in equal measure by
prison wardens and prisoners, cab drivers and
college professors. What is more surprising (and
perhaps more dangerous), a consensus seems to
be emerging on the shape of desirable
reform-reducing discretion and the widespread disparity that is its shadow, abolishing
parole decisions based on whether a prisoner
can convince a parole board he has been "reformed," and creating a system in which
punishment depends much more importantly
than at present on the seriousness of the particular offense.
A number of books and committee reports
that have endorsed these goals and proposed
various structural reforms to achieve them are
the stimulus for this essay. While diverse in
style, vocabulary and emphasis, at least six books
in the past two years have proposed eroding the
arenas of discretion in the system.' Some au*Professor of Law and Director of The Centerfor Studies in
Criminaljustice.
1. Norval Morris, The Futureof Imprisonment (University of
Chicago Press, 1974); James Q. Wilson, ThinkingAbout Crime
(Basic Books, 1975); Ernst van den Haag, PunishingCriminals (Basic Books, 1975); Andrew von Hirsch, Doing
Justice-The Choice of Punishments, the Report of the Committee
for the Study of Incarceration (Hill and Wang, 1976); David
Fogel, We Are the Living Proof: The JusticeModel of Corrections
(W. H. Anderson, 1975); Task Force on Criminal Sentencing,
Fair and Certain Punishment--Report of the Twentieth Century
Task Force on Criminal Sentencing (McGraw-Hill, 1976).
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thors, such as James Q. Wilson and Ernst van
den Haag, see reform as a path to enhancing
crime control. Others, such as Andrew von
Hirsch, the Twentieth Century Fund Committee
and David Fogel, advocate reform for less
utilitarian reasons, with titles or subtitles such as
"Doing Justice," "A Justice Model of Corrections," and "Fair and Certain Punishment."
This note cannot comprehensively review
such a rich collection of literature, nor is it politic for me to oppose justice, fairness or certainty.
Rather, I propose to summarize the present allocation of sentencing power in the criminal justice system and discuss some of the implications
of the "structural reforms" advocated in some
current literature.

Multiple Discretions in Sentencing
The best single phrase to describe the allocation of sentencing power in state and federal
criminal justice is multiple discretion. Putting
aside the enormous power of the police to decide whether to arrest, and to select initial
charges, there are four separate institutions that
have the power to determine criminal
sentences-the legislature, the prosecutor, the
judge, and the parole board or its equivalent.
The legislature sets the range of sentences legally authorized after conviction for a particular
criminal charge. Criminal law in the United
States is noted for extremely wide ranges of sentencing power, delegated by legislation to discretionary fgents, with extremely high maximum pendties and very few limits on how
much less than the maximum can be imposed.
In practice, then, most legislatures delegate
their sentencing powers to other institutions.
For example, second degree murder in Pennsylvania, prior to 1973, was punishable by "not
more than 20 years" in the state penitentiary. 2
2. The old Pennsylvania statute is used as an example
because we have recently studied the old distribution of
punishment for criminal homicide in Philadelphia. See
Zimring, Eigen and O'Malley, "Punishing Homicide in
Philadelphia: Perspectives on the Death Penalty," 43
University of Chicago Law Review 227 (1976).
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Any sentence above 20 years could not be imposed; any sentence below 20 years-including
probation-was within the power of the sentencing judge.
The prosecutor is not normally thought of as an
official who has, or exercises, the power to determine punishment. In practice, however, the
prosecutor is the most important institutional
determinant of a criminal sentence. He has the
legal authority to drop criminal charges, thus
ending the possibility of punishment. He has
the legal authority in most systems to determine
the specific offense for which a person is to be
prosecuted, and this ability to select a charge can
also broaden or narrow the range of sentences
that can be imposed upon conviction. In congested urban court systems (and elsewhere) he
has the absolute power to reduce charges in exchange for guilty pleas and to recommend particular sentences to the court as part of a "plea
bargain"; rarely will his recommendation for a
lenient sentence be refused in an adversary system in which he is supposed to represent the
punitive interests of the state.
The judge has the power to select a sentence
from the wide range made available by the legislature for any charge that produces a conviction. His powers are discretionary-within this
range of legally authorized sanctions his selection cannot be appealed, and is not reviewed.
Thus, under the Pennsylvania system we
studied, a defendant convicted of second degree
murder can be sentenced to probation, one year
in the penitentiary or 20 years. On occasion, the
legislature will provide a mandatory minimum
sentence, such as life imprisonment for first degree murder, that reduces the judge's options
once a defendant has been convicted of that
particular offense. In such cases the prosecutor
and judge retain the option to charge or convict
a defendant for a lesser offense in order to retain their discretionary power.5 More often the
judge has a wide range of sentencing choices
and, influenced by the prosecutor's recommen3. See Zimring et at., supra note 2, at pp. 229-41.
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dation, will select either a single sentence (e.g.,
two years) or a minimum and maximum sentence (e.g., not less than two nor more than five
years) for a particular offender.
The parole or correctional authority normally
has the power to modify judicial sentences to a
considerable degree. When the judge pronounces a single sentence, such s two years,
usually legislation authorizes release from
prison to parole after a specified proportion of
the sentence has been served. When the judge
has provided for a minimum and maximum
sentence, such as two to five years, the relative
power of the correctional or parole authority is
increased, because it has the responsibility to determine at what point in a prison sentence the
offender is to be released. The parole board's
decision is a discretionary one, traditionally
made without guidelines or principles of decision.
This outline of our present sentencing system
necessarily misses the range of variation among
jurisdictions in the fifty states and the federal
system, and oversimplifies the complex interplay among institutions in each system. It is useful, however, as a context in which to consider
specific proposed reforms; it also helps to explain why the labyrinthine status quo has few
articulate defenders. With all our emphasis on
due process in the determination of guilt, our
machinery for setting punishment lacks any
principle except unguided discretion. Plea bargaining, disparity of treatment and uncertainty
are all symptoms of a larger malaise-the absence of rules or even guidelines in determining
the distribution of punishments. Other societies,
less committed to the rule of law, or less infested
with crime, might suffer such a system. Powerful voices are beginning to tell us we cannot.

Parole under Attack
Of all the institutions that comprise the present system, parole is the most vulnerable-a
practice that appears to be based on a nowdiscredited theoretical foundation of rehabilita6

tion and individual predictability. The theory
was that penal facilities rehabilitate prisoners
and that parole authorities could select which
inmates were ready, and when they were ready,
to reenter the community. The high-water mark
of such thinking is the indeterminate
sentence-a term of one-year-to-life at the discretion of the correctional authority for any
adult imprisoned after conviction for a felony.
Ironically, while this theory was under sustained
(and ultimately successful) attack in California,
New York was passing a set of drug laws that
used the one-year-to-life sentence as its primary
dispositive device. Yet we know (or think we
know) that prison rehabilitation programs
"don't work," and our capacities to make individual predictions of future behavior are minimal.
So why not abolish parole in favor of a system
where the sentence pronounced by the judge is
that which is served by the offender? The cost of
post-imprisonment sentence adjustments are
many: they turn our prisons into "acting
schools," promote disparity, enrage inmates,
and undermine both justice and certainty.'
There are, however, a number of functions
performed by parole that have little to do with
the theory of rehabilitation or individual predictability. A parole system allows us to advertise
heavy criminal sanctions loudly at the time of
sentencing and later reduce sentences quietly.
This "discounting" function is evidently of some
practical importance, because David Fogel's
plan to substitute "flat time" sentences for
parole is designed so that the advertised "determinate sentences" for each offense are twice
as long as the time the offender will actually
serve (since each prisoner gets a month off his
sentence for every month he serves without a
major disciplinary infraction). In a system that
seems addicted to barking louder than it really
wants to bite, parole (and "good time" as well)
can help protect us from harsh sentences while
4. Fogel, supra note 1, at pp. 196-99.
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allowing the legislature and judiciary the posture of law and order.
It is also useful to view the abolition of parole
in terms of its impact on the distribution of sentencing power in the system. Reducing the
power of the parole board increases the power
of the legislature, prosecutor and judge. If the
abolition of parole is not coupled with more
concrete legislative directions on sentencing, the
amount of discretion in a system will not decrease; instead, discretionary power will be concentrated in two institutions (judge and prosecutor) rather than three. The impact of this
reallocation is hard to predict. Yet parole is usually a statewide function, while judges and prosecutors are local officials in most states. One
function of parole may be to even out disparities
in sentencing behavior among different
localities. Abolishing parole, by decentralizing
discretion, may increase sentencing disparity, at
least as to prison sentences, because the same
crime is treated differently by different judges
and prosecutors. Three discretions may be better than twol
There are two methods available to avoid
these problems. Norval Morris argues for retaining a parole function but divorcing it from
rehabilitation and individual prediction by providing that a release date be set in the early
stages of an offender's prison career. This
would continue the parole functions of "discounting" and disparity reduction, while reducing uncertainty and the incentive for prisoners
to "act reformed." It is a modest, sensible proposal, but it is not meant to address the larger
problems of discretion and disparity in the rest
of the system.'

Fixed Price Sentencing
A more heroic reform is to reallocate most of
the powers now held by judges and parole authorities back to the legislature. Crimes would
be defined with precision and specific offenses
5. Morris, supra note 1,at pp. 47-50.
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would carry specified sentences, along with lists
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
that could modify the penalty. The three books
with "justice" or "fairness" in their titles advocate this "price list" approach, albeit for different reasons and with different degrees of
sophistication. The Twentieth Century Fund
study goes beyond advocating this approach
and sets out sections of a sample penal code,
although all members of the committee do not
agree on the specific "presumptive sentences"
provided in the draft.
There is much appeal in the simple notion
that a democratically elected legislature should
be capable of fixing sentences for crimes against
the community. Yet this is precisely what
American criminal justice has failed to do, and
the barriers to a fair and just system of fixed
sentences are imposing. The Twentieth Century
Fund scheme of "presumptive sentences," because it is the most sophisticated attempt to date,
will serve as an illustration of the formidable
collection of problems that confront a system of
"Fair and Certain" legislatively determined
punishments. In brief, the proposal outlines a
scale of punishments for those first convicted
that ranges (excluding murder) from six years
in prison (aggravated assault) to probation
(shoplifting). Premeditated murder is punished
with ten years' imprisonment. Burglary of an
empty house by an unarmed offender has a presumptive sentence of six months; burglary of an
abandoned dwelling yields a presumptive sentence of six months' probation. The sample
code clearly aims at singling out violent crimes
such as armed robbery for heavier penalties,
while the scale for nonviolent offenders led two
of the eleven Task Force members to argue that
the "range. . . appears to be unrealistically low
in terms of obtaining public or legislative
support." Repeat offenders receive higher presumptive sentences, under specific guidelines.
The Task Force proposal produces in me an
6. Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 55-56.
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unhappily schizophrenic response. I agree with
the aims and priorities of the report, at the same
time that I suspect the introduction of this (or
many other) reform proposals into the legislative process might do more harm than good.
Why so skeptical? Consider a few of the obstacles to making the punishment fit the crime:
1. The incoherence of the criminallaw.* Any system of punishment that attaches a single sanction to a particular offense must define offenses
with a morally persuasive precision that present
laws do not possess. In my home state of Illinois,
burglary is defined so that an armed housebreaker is guilty of the same offense as an
18-year-old who opens the locked glove compartment of my unlocked stationwagon. Obviously, no single punishment can be assigned to
crime defined in such sweeping terms. But can
we be precise? The Task Force tried, providing
illustrative definitions of five different kinds of
night-time housebreaking with presumptive
sentences from two years (for armed burglary,
where the defendant menaces an occupant)
through six months' probation. The Task Force
did not attempt to deal with daylight or nonresidential burglary.
The problem is not simply that any such penal
code will make our present statutes look like
Reader's Digest Condensed Books; we lack the
capacity to define into formal law the nuances of
situation, intent and social harm that condition
the seriousness of particular criminal acts. For
example, the sample code provides six years in
prison for "premeditated assault" in which serious harm was intended and two years for assaults
where serious harm was not intended." While
there may be some conceptual distinction between these two mental states, one cannot confidently divide hundreds of thousands of gun
and knife attacks into these categories to determine whether a "Fair and Certain Punishment"
is six years or two.
Rape, an offense that encompasses a huge
*The phrase is borrowed from my colleague, James
White, who is preparing a book with this title.
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variety of behaviors, is graded into three
punishments: six years (when accompanied by
an assault that causes bodily injury); three years
(when there is no additional bodily harm); and
six months (when committed on a previous sex
partner, with no additional bodily harm). Two
further aggravating conditions are also
specified.' Put aside for a moment the fact that
prior consensual sex reduces the punishment by
a factor of six and the problem that rape with
bodily harm has a "presumptive sentence" one
year longer than intentional killing. Have we
really defined the offense into its penologically
significant categories? Can we rigorously patrol
the border between forcible rape without additional bodily harm and that with further
harm-when that distinction can mean the difference between six months and six years in the
penitentiary?
I am not suggesting that these are problems
of sloppy drafting. Rather, we may simply lack
the ability to comprehensively define in advance
those elements of an offense that should be considered in fixing a criminal sentence.
2. The paradox of prosecutorialpower. A system
of determinate sentences reallocates the sentencing power shared by the judge and parole
authorities to the legislature and the prosecutor.
While the judge can no longer select from a
wide variety of sanctions after conviction, the
prosecutor's powers to select charges and to
plea-bargain remain. Indeed, a criminal code
like that proposed by the Twentieth Century
Fund Task Force will enhance the relative
power of the prosecutor by removing parole
and restricting the power of judges. The long
list of different offenses proposed in the report
provides the basis for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion: the selection of initial charges
and the offer to reduce charges (chargebargaining) are more important in a fixed-price
system precisely because the charge at convic7. The aggravating factors are (1) "the victim was under
15 or over 70 years of age" and (2) the victim was held
captive for over two hours. Task Force Report at p. 59.
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tion determines the sentence. The prosecutor
files a charge of "premeditated" killing (10
years) and offers to reduce the charge to "intentional" killing (5 years) in exchange for a guilty
plea. In most of the major crimes defined by the
Task Force-homicide, rape, burglary, larceny
and robbery-a factual nuance separates two
grades of the offense where the presumptive
sentence for the higher grade is twice that of the
lower grade.8
This means that the disparity between sentences following a guilty plea and those following jury trial is almost certain to remain. Similarly, disparity between different areas and different prosecutors will remain, because one
man's "premeditation" can always be another's
"intention." It is unclear whether total disparity
will decrease, remain stable, or increase under a
regime of determinate sentences. It is certain
that disparities will remain.
The paradox of prosecutorial power under
determinate sentencing is that exorcising discretion from two of the three discretionary agencies in criminal sentencing does not necessarily
reduce either the role of discretion in sentence
determination or the total amount of sentence
disparity. Logically, three discretions may be
better than one. The practical lesson is that no
8. The presumptive sentence for rape doubles with an
assault causing bodily injury. The penalty for armed robbery where the offender discharges a firearm is three years
if the offender did not intend to injure and five years if
intent can be established. The presumptive sentence is two
years if the weapon is discharged but the prosecutor cannot
or does not establish that "the likelihood of personal injury is
high." The penalty for armed burglary doubles when the
dwelling is occupied. An armed burglar who "brandishes a
weapon" in an occupied dwelling receives 24 months while a
nonbrandishing armed burglar receives 18. Assault is
punished with 6 years when "premeditated" and commited
with intent to cause harm, Without intent, the presumptive
sentence is two years. See Fair and Certain Punishment at pp.
38-39, 56-59. Threat of force in larceny means the difference between six and twenty-four months. As I read the
robbery and larceny statutes, armed taking of property by
threat to use force is punished with a presumptive sentence of
six months on page 40 of the report while the same behavior
receives 24 months on pages 60-61.
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serious program to create a rule of law in determining punishment can ignore the pivotal
role of the American prosecutor.
3. The legislative law-and-order syndrome. Two
members of the Twentiety Century Fund Task
Force express doubts that a legislature will endorse six-month sentences for burglary, even if
it could be shown that six months is above or
equal to the present sentence served. I share
their skepticism. When the legislature determines sentencing ranges, it is operating at a
level of abstraction far removed from individual
case dispositions, or even the allocation of resources to courts and correctional agencies. At
that level of abstraction the symbolic quality of
the criminal sanction is of great importance.
The penalty provisions in most of our criminal
codes are symbolic denunciations of particular
behavior patterns, rather than decisions about
just sentences. This practice has been supported
by the multiple ameliorating discretions in the
present system.
It is the hope of most of the advocates of determinate sentencing that the responsibilities
thrust on the legislature by their reforms will
educate democratically elected officials to view
their function with realism and responsibility
-to recognize the need for priorities and moderation in fixing punishment. This is a hope, not
firmly supported by the history of penal policy
and not encouraged by a close look at the operation and personnel of state legislatures.
Yet reallocating power to the legislature
means gambling on our ability to make major
changes in the way elected officials think, talk
and act about crime. Once a determinate sentencing bill is before a legislative body, it takes
no more than an eraser to make a one-year
"presumptive sentence" into a six-year sentence
for the same offense. The delicate scheme of
priorities in any well-conceived sentencing
proposal can be torpedoed by amendment with
ease and political appeal. In recent history,
those who have followed the moral career of the
13

sentencing scheme proposed by Governor
Brown's Commission on Law Reform through
the Senate Subcommittee on Crime can testify
to the enormous impact of apparently minor
structural changes on the relative bite of the
sentencing system.9
If the legislative response to determinate sentencing proposals is penal inflation, this will not
necessarily lead to a reign of terror. The same
powerful prosecutorial discretions that limit the
legislature's ability to work reform also prevent
the legislature from doing too much harm.
High fixed-sentences could be reduced; discretion and disparity could remain.
4. The lack of consensus and principle. But what
if we could trade disparity for high mandatory
sentences beyond those merited by utilitarian or
retributive demands of justice? Would it be a
fair trade? It could be argued that a system
which treats some offenders unjustly is preferable to one in which all are treated unjustly.
Equality is only one, not the exclusive, criterion
for fairness.
This last point leads to a more fundamental
concern about the link between structural reform and achieving justice. The Task Force asks
the question with eloquent simplicity: "How
long is too long? How short is too short?"10 The
question is never answered in absolute terms;
indeed, it is unanswerable. We lack coherent
principles on which to base judgments of relative social harm. Current titles of respectable
books on this subject range from "Punishing
Criminals" to "The End of Imprisonment," and
the reader can rest assured that the contents
vary as much as the labels. Yet how can we mete
9. Compare the Final Report of the National Commission
on Reforms of Federal Criminal Laws (Government Printing Office, 1971) with Senate Bill 1, 94th Cong. 1st Session
(1975). Among other things, the Senate bill changes a presumption in favor of probation to a presumption against
probation, increases the number of felonies in the proposed
code and increases the length of authorized sentences by a
considerable margin. See Schwartz, The Proposed Federal
Criminal Code, Criminal Law Reporter, Vol. 17. p. 3203 (1975).
10. Task Force Report, supra note 1,at p. 4.
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out fair punishment without agreeing on what is
fair? How can we do justice before we define it?

Determinate sentencing may do more good
than harm; the same can be said for sharp curtailment of judicial and parole discretion. Such
reforms will, however, be difficult to implement,
measure and judge. Predicting the impact of
any of the current crop of reform proposals
with any degree of certainty is a hazardous if not
foolhardy occupation.
Not the least of the vices of our present lawless structures of criminal sentencing is that they
mask a deeper moral and intellectual bankruptcy in the criminal law and the society it is
supposed to serve. The paramount value of
these books and reform proposals is not the
"structural reforms" that each proposes or opposes. It is the challenge implicit in all current
debate: no matter what the problems with particular reforms, the present system is intolerable. The problems are deeper than overcrowding or lack of coordination, more profound
than the structure of the sentencing system.
These problems are as closely tied to our culture
as to our criminal law. They are problems of
principle that have been obscured by the tactical
inadequacies of the present system.

Note: This article appeared in a slightly altered version in
the December, 1976 Hastings Center Report.
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